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INTRODUCTION

Under the guise of a health and safety rationale, a recent trend
has seen individual states regulating aspects of agricultural
production in a way that applies equally to products produced in
state and out of state. These regulations, such as labelling laws and
animal welfare restrictions, apply to products sold in the state
enacting the regulation. But the regulations also have a much
broader impact on the industry that extends beyond the borders of
that state.
The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine has long prohibited
regulation that burdens interstate commerce. The history of
dormant Commerce Clause litigation includes challenges to
regulations regarding safety features on highway vehicles, species of
fish, and produce packaging.1 In considering these regulations,
courts weigh the incidental burden on interstate commerce against
the local benefit.
Both litigation, which ultimately uses the burden against benefit
balancing test, and congressional action can resolve questions about
the constitutionality of agricultural regulations under the
Commerce Clause. Various state regulations prescribing laying hen
cage sizes have provided some of the more recent opportunities for
courts to conduct the balancing test; in one case, the Ninth Circuit
dismissed a challenge to a California cage size law in November
2016.2 In contrast, a Vermont “genetically modified organism”
(“GMO”) labelling law was challenged through litigation,3 but
Congress reached a nationwide solution.4 This national solution
preempted Vermont’s state law and reduced the burden on
manufacturers by creating a uniform national standard.5 Because of
1. See infra Section II.A.3.
2. Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 847 F.3d 646, 656 (9th Cir. 2017), amending
and superseding 842 F.3d 658 (2016) (considering a challenge to CAL. CODE REGS. tit.
3, § 1350(d)(1) and Assembly Bill 1437).
3. See infra Section II.B.2.a.
4. See infra Section II.B.2.b.
5. See National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, Pub. L. No.
114-216, 130 Stat. 834 (2016) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1639b) (preempting state
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the difficulty and expense of litigating each instance individually,
resolving the constitutionality of agricultural regulations through
congressional action is superior to litigating state actions. Therefore,
Congress should enact legislation prohibiting states from regulating
agricultural production in a way that puts an excessive burden on
interstate commerce; this could be accomplished either through a
specific federal law for cage sizes that would preempt state laws or a
more general federal law about state regulation of products in
interstate commerce.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine
1.

The Commerce Clause

In a dual federalist system of government like the United States’,
the federal government and state governments each have designated
powers.6 Sometimes, federal and state areas of legislative power
overlap.7 Such is the case with Congress’s interstate commerce
power, which has been broadly construed and often conflicts with
traditional state authority.8
In general, Congress has only the powers enumerated in the
U.S. Constitution, while the states retain non-enumerated powers
that the states had prior to the Constitution’s existence.9 For

food labeling standards that are not identical to the federal standard); VT. CODE R.
§ 121 (2016) (regulating food labeling for genetically engineered foods); GE Food,
VT. ATT’Y GEN.’S OFF., http://ago.vermont.gov/hot-topics/ge-food-litigation.php
(last visited Dec. 26, 2016) (discussing litigation challenging VT. CODE R. § 121
(West, Westlaw through Jan. 13, 2017)).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 144 (2010). “The powers
‘delegated to the United States by the Constitution’ include those specifically
enumerated powers listed in Article I along with the implementation authority
granted by the Necessary and Proper Clause.” Id. (citation omitted). On the other
hand, per the Tenth Amendment, “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.” Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. X).
7. See, e.g., Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245, 252 (1829)
(considering whether the building of a dam on a marsh creek is within the State’s
power over property, or whether the action conflicts with the federal power to
regulate interstate waterways under the Commerce Clause).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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example, Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution gives
Congress the power “[t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes,”10 while
states retain traditional, non-enumerated police powers.11 The
states’ traditional police powers include legislation on matters
“detrimental to public health or morals, or the public safety
generally. The power of the States to pass quarantine and inspection
laws has never been questioned, and it includes that of prescribing
the necessary regulations, as well as the subjects to which they may
be applied.”12
2.

The Supremacy Clause

If the federal government and the state government both
regulate in the same area and the laws conflict, the federal law
prevails.13 Thus, under the Supremacy Clause, if Congress regulates
in an area where it is authorized to do so by the Constitution, that
act of regulation is said to preempt state and local regulation.14 Local
regulations can also implicate the Supremacy Clause when they
“would pass muster under the Due Process Clause, . . . [but] run
afoul of the policy of free trade reflected in the Commerce Clause.”15
3.

The Dormant Commerce Clause

If Congress has not acted to exclude the states, states may
regulate using their police power even if Congress has the power to
regulate in the same area,16 unless doing so would violate the
10. Id. art. I, § 8.
11. Hannibal & St. J.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 467 (1877) (“Whilst the
power to regulate commerce is granted to Congress, that of establishing interior
police regulations belongs to the States.”).
12. Id. at 468 (citations omitted) (quoting Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington
Ry., 27 Vt. 140 (1854)).
13. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
14. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 41 (1824) (“Each party possessing the power,
may of course use it. Each being sovereign as to the power, may use it in any form,
and in relation to any subject; and to guard against a conflict in practice, the law of
Congress is made supreme.”).
15. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529 (1959) (citations
omitted).
16. Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245, 252 (1829) (“If
Congress had passed any act which bore upon the case; any act in execution of the
power to regulate commerce, the object of which was to control state legislation
over those small navigable creeks into which the tide flows . . . we should feel not
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dormant Commerce Clause.17 The dormant Commerce Clause is not
an actual clause in the Constitution but has been inferred from the
Commerce Clause and developed in case law.18 As stated in Willson
v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., the dormant Commerce Clause may be
violated where a state regulation is “repugnant to [Congress’s]
power to regulate commerce in its dormant state.”19 In other words,
even where Congress has not acted, if Congress could regulate an
area of commerce, a state regulation in that area may be invalid even
though there is no direct conflict with federal law.20 Where state and
local laws put an undue burden on interstate commerce, they violate
the dormant Commerce Clause.21
The Supreme Court identifies two types of state statutes that
improperly regulate interstate commerce: (1) “statutes that burden
interstate transactions only incidentally,” and (2) statutes that
“affirmatively discriminate” against interstate transactions.22 To
determine whether state statutes affecting interstate commerce are
valid, the general rule is: “Where the statute regulates even-handedly
to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to
the putative local benefits.”23
A state regulation with the clear intent on the face of the statute
to discriminate against out-of-state interests “invokes the strictest
much difficulty in saying that a state law coming in conflict with such act would be
void. But Congress has passed no such act.”).
17. Id. (“The repugnancy of the law of Delaware to the Constitution is placed
entirely on its repugnancy to the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations
and among the several states; a power which has not been so exercised as to affect
the question. We do not think that the act empowering the Black Bird Creek Marsh
Company to place a dam across the creek, can, under all the circumstances of the
case, be considered as repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant
state, or as being in conflict with any law passed on the subject.”).
18. See id.
19. Id. (alteration in original).
20. See id.
21. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
22. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).
23. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,
362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)) (“The basic limitations upon local legislative power in this
area are clear enough. The controlling principles have been reiterated over the
years in a host of this Court’s decisions. Evenhanded local regulation to effectuate
a legitimate local public interest is valid unless pre-empted by federal action . . . or
unduly burdensome on . . . interstate commerce . . . .”).
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scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose.”24 Where the
state regulation does not have a stated discriminatory purpose, but
it uses discriminatory means, it will be subject to strict scrutiny
review.25
The Court has often invalidated regulations that do not
technically discriminate against out-of-state interests but
nevertheless unduly burden interstate commerce. For example, in
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., an Arizona state law placed an undue
burden on interstate commerce by requiring cantaloupes grown in
Arizona to be processed in Arizona in order to be labeled as Arizona
cantaloupes.26 The company challenging the law grew cantaloupes
in Arizona but had a cantaloupe packaging plant across the border
in California.27 The company would have needed to spend at least
$200,000 to comply with the act by building a second packaging
plant in Arizona.28 This state law placed an undue burden on
interstate commerce.29 The interest in labeling premium
cantaloupes grown in Arizona was a legitimate local purpose, but
forcing the packing company to build a second packaging plant had
Commerce Clause implications that outweighed the local benefit.30
Also invalidating a regulation, but on the basis that there
essentially was no valid local purpose, the Court in Raymond Motor
Transportation, Inc. v. Rice invalidated a Wisconsin statute31 that
prohibited trucks longer than fifty-five feet from being operated on
state highways without a permit.32 The challenged regulations
“[made] no more than the most speculative contribution to highway
safety.”33 The Court took notice of the “great number of exceptions”
to the rule, “especially those that discriminate[d] in favor of local

24. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979).
25. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 139; see City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617,
617 (1978) (“The crucial inquiry here must be directed to determining whether
[the regulation] is basically an economic protectionist measure, and thus virtually
per se invalid, or a law directed at legitimate local concerns that has only incidental
effects on interstate commerce.”).
26. Pike, 397 U.S. at 146.
27. Id. at 139.
28. Id. at 140.
29. Id. at 146.
30. Id.
31. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 447–48 (1978).
32. Id. at 432.
33. Id. at 429.
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industry.”34 The exceptions undermined the assumption that “the
State’s own political processes [would] act as a check on local
regulations that unduly burden interstate commerce.”35
In Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., another case implicating the
balancing test, an Illinois law required trucks and trailers on the
state’s highways to be equipped with a unique type of curved
mudguard that was not common in the industry.36 The state argued
that the mudguard promoted safety by protecting motorists driving
behind the trucks from being hit with mud or debris.37 The Court
observed that a unique law could have a local benefit significant
enough to outweigh the burden on interstate commerce:
[a] State which insists on a design out of line with the
requirements of almost all the other States may sometimes
place a great burden of delay and inconvenience on those
interstate motor carriers entering or crossing its territory.
Such a new safety device—out of line with the requirements
of other States—may be so compelling that the innovating
State need not be the one to give way.38
But the Court determined that the claimed benefit of this new
technology when balanced against the clear burden on commerce
was “far too inconclusive to make this mudguard meet that test.”39
Maine v. Taylor is one of the rare cases in which the legitimate
local purpose for a statute was found to outweigh the statute’s
burden on interstate commerce.40 In that case, the state of Maine
prohibited importing live baitfish.41 The purpose of the regulation
was to protect Maine’s fish population from harmful non-native,
invasive species.42 Standardized techniques for inspection of baitfish

34. Id.
35. Id. at 447.
36. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529–30 (1959).
37. See id. at 521 n.1.
38. Id. at 529–30.
39. Id. at 530.
40. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 131 (1986).
41. See id. at 132.
42. See id. at 140–41 (“First, Maine’s population of wild fish—including its own
indigenous golden shiners—would be placed at risk by three types of parasites
prevalent in out-of-state baitfish, but not common to wild fish in Maine. Second,
nonnative species inadvertently included in shipments of live baitfish could disturb
Maine’s aquatic ecology to an unpredictable extent by competing with native fish
for food or habitat, by preying on native species, or by disrupting the environment
in more subtle ways.” (citations omitted)).
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did not exist at the time.43 The Court applied strict scrutiny and
found in favor of the statute44 because the evidence in that case
amply “support[ed] the District Court’s findings that Maine’s ban on
the importation of live baitfish serv[ed] legitimate local purposes
that could not adequately be served by available nondiscriminatory
alternatives.”45
B.

Recent Agricultural Litigation Regulating Interstate Commerce

One of the more recent areas of regulation to potentially run
afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause is regulation of agricultural
production and processing. States may find these regulations subject
to challenge as they impose burdens across the United States.
Litigation over laying hen cage sizes, which have been the subject of
different requirements in different states, has demonstrated the
problem with these individual state regulations. In contrast, uniform
national regulation can be less burdensome than (often conflicting)
individual state regulations. Although no federal solution has been
made in the egg laying industry, the GMO labelling law passed by
Congress in 2016 provides an example of how a national regulation
can provide the solution to patchwork regulation.
1.

Regulations of Cage Sizes for Egg-Laying Hens

At least two jurisdictions have enacted regulation of hen cage
sizes for hens laying eggs to be sold in that jurisdiction, each with
differing requirements.46 This creates a salmagundi of standards for
egg producers, who often sell eggs across the United States, to sort
through. A California law was enacted and survived a challenge that
went to the Ninth Circuit; the case was dismissed primarily on
standing grounds.47 A Massachusetts law, one of the broadest
regulations of its type, that regulates hen cage sizes under an animal
cruelty rationale, has yet to face a challenge in court.48 These
regulations demonstrate the inherent problems with local
regulations that infringe on interstate commerce.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See id. at 146.
Id. at 151–52.
Id. at 151.
See infra Section II.B.1.a, b.
See infra Section II.B.1.a.
See infra Section II.B.1.b.
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California’s Proposition 2

A recent California ballot initiative provides a stellar example of
legislation challenged as too restrictive on agricultural commerce.49
In 2008, California voters approved a ballot initiative called
Proposition 2 that, starting January 1, 2015, made it illegal in
California to “tether or confine any covered animal [including egglaying hens], on a farm, for all or the majority of any day, in a manner
that prevents such animal from (a) Lying down, standing up, and
fully extending his or her limbs; and (b) Turning around freely.”50
Compliance requires a minimum of 116 square inches of floor space
per bird.51
In March 2014, after California passed Proposition 2 and
drafted laws in accordance with the proposition, the states of
Missouri, Iowa, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Kentucky, and Alabama
brought suit against the new California laws, specifically the
provisions governing the sale of “shell eggs.”52 Among other things,
the regulation requires producers to enclose hens that lay eggs
ultimately sold in California in cages that meet certain size
requirements.53 The states alleged that the new laws, Assembly Bill
1437 (“AB 1437”) and Proposition 2, which became CDFA Shell Egg
Food Safety regulation 1350(d), collectively referred to as the “Shell
Egg Laws,” placed an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce.54 CDFA Shell Egg Food Safety regulation 1350(d),
enacted in 2013 and effective in 2015, applies to California egg
producers. Subsequently, AB 1437 was specifically enacted to protect
California egg producers required to comply with Proposition 2
from competition with out-of-state egg producers.55 The law subject
to dormant Commerce Clause challenge, therefore, is AB 1437,
49. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 3, § 1350 (West, Westlaw through Jan. 13, 2017)
[hereinafter CDFA Shell Egg Food Safety regulation 1350(d)]; Brief for Appellants
at 2, Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 842 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 14-17111)
[hereinafter Appellants’ Brief].
50. Appellant’s Brief at 6.
51. See id. at 14 (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 3, § 1350(d)(1) (West, Westlaw
through Jan. 13, 2017)).
52. Id. at 3.
53. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 3, § 1350(d) (“Commencing January 1, 2015, no egg
handler or producer may sell or contract to sell a shelled egg for human
consumption in California if it is the product of an egg-laying hen that was confined
in an enclosure that fails to comply with [certain] standards.”).
54. Appellant’s Brief at 15.
55. See id. at 12:22.

460

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:2

because it is the one that applies the cage size requirements to eggs
sold in California produced by hens outside of California.
The challenge was dismissed for the state plaintiffs lack of
standing to sue on behalf of their residents.56 The court found that
the suit was really on behalf of a few producers who might be affected
by the California regulation,57 which is not sufficient to confer
standing to the state.58 The court did not reach the merits of the
case.59
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the Appellant States challenged
the rulings on standing, ripeness, and whether the district court’s
dismissal of the complaint without leave to amend was an abuse of
discretion.60 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district
court.61 The Ninth Circuit held that the parties challenging the law
lacked standing; the egg producers themselves, not the states, should
bring suit if they want to challenge the California law.62
b.

Massachusetts Farm Animal Cruelty Act

On November 8, 2016, Massachusetts passed the Massachusetts
Farm Animal Cruelty Act, one of the country’s broadest regulations
regarding the sale of eggs and meat from confined animals.63 Its
stated purpose is to “prevent animal cruelty by phasing out extreme
methods of farm animal confinement, which also threaten the
health and safety of Massachusetts consumers, increase the risk of
foodborne illness, and have negative fiscal impacts on the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts[,]” arguably a health and safety
rationale.64 The regulation makes it unlawful for a farm owner
“within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to knowingly cause any
covered animal to be confined in a cruel manner.”65 This law
56. Missouri v. Harris, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1075 (E.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d and
remanded sub nom. Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 842 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2016),
withdrawn from bound volume, and aff’d and remanded, 847 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2017).
57. Id. at 1072–73.
58. Id. at 1073.
59. See id.
60. See Appellants’ Brief, supra note 49, at 2.
61. See Harris, 847 F.3d at 650.
62. Id. at 664.
63. See MASS. GEN LAWS. ANN. ch. 129 app. at § 1-1 (West, Westlaw Current
through Chapter 20 of the 2017 1st Annual Session).
64. See id.
65. Id. § 1-2.
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prohibits cruel confinement of not only egg-laying hens but also
breeding pigs and calves raised for veal.66
The statute defines “confined in a cruel manner” as that which
“prevent[s] a covered animal from lying down, standing up, fully
extending the animal’s limbs, or turning around freely.”67 The
regulation also prevents business owners from knowingly selling
pork, veal, or eggs from animals unlawfully confined, even if the
source is outside of Massachusetts.68 Under the statute, a laying hen
must have at least 1.5 square feet of usable floor space to be
considered able to fully extend its limbs.69 The rules and regulations
implementing the Act must be in place by January 1, 2020, and the
Act will take effect two years later on January 1, 2022.70 This
regulation illustrates the continuing patchwork of laws producers
will face when attempting to comply with cage size and other
restrictions in producing eggs. There is no indication that the Act
has been challenged yet in litigation; however, litigation on dormant
Commerce Clause grounds may be forthcoming if a national federal
solution is not reached.
2.

Vermont GMO Labelling Law

Litigation in multiple states to challenge varying standards does
not need to be the outcome of the hen cage size dispute. Instead, a
uniform federal law could be passed to set a national standard, as
occurred in a recent dispute regarding a GMO labeling statute in
Vermont. The state of Vermont enacted Act 120, which took effect
on July 1, 2016.71 Act 120 required retailers to label food produced
with genetic engineering as either entirely or partially produced
from genetic engineering.72
a.

Dormant Commerce Clause Litigation

In response to the Vermont GMO law, several associations
brought a federal court challenge for declaratory and injunctive

66. Id. § 1-5(D).
67. Id. § 1-5(E).
68. See id. § 1-3.
69. Id. § 1-5(J).
70. See id. §§ 1-10, 1-11.
71. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 3041–3048 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.
and 2016 Special Sess.).
72. Id. § 3043.
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relief.73 The Complaint alleged several claims, including First
Amendment free speech violations,74 violations of the Due Process
Clause,75 violations of the Commerce Clause,76 and violations of the
Supremacy Clause.77
In its Commerce Clause claim, the associations alleged that Act
120 required manufacturers to label their products in specific ways
and placed advertising restrictions on products in Vermont.78 The
Complaint further alleged that:
The vast majority of Plaintiffs’ members are manufacturers
located outside the State of Vermont. There are no major
food manufacturers based in Vermont, and Vermont’s
restaurant and dairy industries, as well as its organic
industry, are all exempted from the Act’s requirements.
Consequently, the cost of implementing the regulation
falls largely, if not entirely, on out-of-state companies.79
The Complaint described the burden as follows:
Plaintiffs’ members sell food in interstate commerce
through nationwide and regional distribution chains. In
order to comply with the Act, they would need to establish
Vermont-specific distribution channels where those
channels do not currently exist. However, there is no
commercially reasonable way to do so, and it may be
impossible to establish such a system before the Act’s
effective date. Therefore, to avoid liability under Act 120,
manufacturers who do not or cannot establish Vermontspecific distribution would have to revise their labeling on
a regional or even nationwide basis, no matter where in the
country their products may ultimately be sold.80
After the district court judge denied an injunction, the
associations appealed the denial to the Second Circuit.81 However,
after Public Law 114-216, the federal GMO labelling law, was
73. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 1, Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v.
Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583 (D. Vt. 2015) (No. 5:14-CV-117), 2014 WL 2965321.
74. Id. at 13, 17.
75. Id. at 18.
76. Id. at 20.
77. Id. at 21.
78. Id. at 18.
79. Id. at 18.
80. Id. at 18–19.
81. See Scott K.G. Kozak, Vermont GMO Battle Continues in Second Circuit, NAT’L
L. REV. (Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/vermont-gmo-battle
-continues-second-circuit.
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enacted,82 Vermont’s Attorney General announced that Vermont
would no longer enforce Act 120,83 presumably because it was
preempted by the federal law. The parties then reached an
agreement to dismiss the case, which was essentially mooted by the
state’s announcement that it would not enforce Act 120.84
b.

Enacted Federal Regulation: Public Law 114-216

Ultimately, the GMO labelling issue was not resolved through
litigation: Congress reached a federal legislative solution to the
problem caused by the Vermont GMO law. Public Law No. 114-216
requires the FDA to establish a national mandatory bioengineered
food disclosure standard.85 The law prevents individual states from
regulating GMO food labeling.86 Instead, food may bear a disclosure
that the food is bioengineered only in accordance with regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture, in accordance with the
law.87 This federal law was a compromise, but the industry ultimately
supported it because it nullified the Vermont law.88 Now, rather than
causing the packaging industry to deal with a patchwork of
inconsistent laws, complying with the single uniform federal law will
be less of a burden on industry actors.
III. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION IS NEEDED TO AVOID INCREASED
LITIGATION
A.

Constitutionality of Regulation of Cage Sizes for Egg-Laying Hens

On the issue of laying hen cage sizes, a federal legislative
solution has not been reached, and the line between state police
power and the dormant Commerce Clause continues to be litigated.
82. National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, Pub. L. No. 114-216,
130 Stat. 834 (2016); see also infra Section II.B.2.b.
83. See Robert Audette, Parties in Vermont GMO Labeling Lawsuit Agree to
Dismissal, VTDIGGER (Sept. 2, 2016, 11:34 AM), https://vtdigger.org
/2016/09/02/parties-vermont-gmo-labeling-lawsuit-agree-dismissal/.
84. Id.
85. 130 Stat. 834.
86. Id. § 295(b).
87. Id. § 293(b)(2)(D).
88. See Dan Charles, Congress Just Passed a GMO Labeling Bill. Nobody’s Super
Happy About It, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 14, 2016, 5:34 PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/07/14/486060866/congress-just
-passed-a-gmo-labeling-bill-nobodys-super-happy-about-it.
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The regulations in California and Massachusetts likely violate the
dormant Commerce Clause by regulating conduct outside their
borders. The California regulations likely have a discriminatory
purpose and would be invalidated on strict scrutiny review. Even if
the purpose was not found to be discriminatory and the law was
determined to have only incidental effects on interstate commerce,
the burden of each law in California and Massachusetts outweighs
the minor value of the legitimate local purpose.
1.

State Regulation with a Discriminatory Means

Where a state regulation does not have a stated discriminatory
purpose but uses discriminatory means, it will be subject to strict
scrutiny review.89 The California regulations should be evaluated
under the discriminatory means test, and strict scrutiny should be
applied. As the Appellants in Missouri v. Harris pointed out, the
California regulations are problematic because they are actually two
different regulations.90 Proposition 2, now codified, applies to instate producers.91 AB 1437 applies to out-of-state producers.92 The
rationale of Proposition 2 is at least arguably related to health and
safety93 because some evidence suggests that requiring hens to live
in cages larger than the traditional sixty-seven square-inch “battery
cages” can reduce exposure to disease pathogens, such as
salmonella.94
89. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (quoting Lacoste v.
Louisiana Dep’t of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545, 550 (1924)) (“[W]hen considering
the purpose of a challenged statute, this Court is not bound by ‘[t]he name,
description or characterization given it by the legislature or the courts of the State,’
but will determine for itself the practical impact of the law.”). This is true even
though the Ninth Circuit found the law was not discriminatory for purposes of
parens patriae standing. Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 847 F.3d 646, 655 (9th Cir.
2017) (quoting Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729
F.3d 937, 948 (9th Cir. 2013)) (“The Shell Egg Laws do not distinguish among eggs
based on their state of origin. A statute that treats ‘both intrastate and interstate
products’ alike ‘is not discriminatory.’”).
90. See Appellants’ Brief, supra note 49, at 13–14 (discussing Phase I and II).
91. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25990 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg.
Sess.); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 3, § 1350(d) (West, Westlaw through Jan. 13, 2017).
92. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 25996.
93. Sarah McNabb, California’s Proposition 2 Has Egg Producers Scrambling: Is It
Constitutional?, 23 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 159, 176 (2014).
94. See Calvin Massey, The California Egg Law and the Dormant Commerce Clause,
THE FAC. LOUNGE (Mar. 13, 2014, 2:51 PM), http://www.thefacultylounge.org
/2014/03/the-california-egg-law-and-the-dormant-commerce-clause.html.
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The rationale of AB 1437, however, is economic protectionism.
After Proposition 2 was passed, there was concern that California’s
over three hundred million dollar egg industry would be at a
competitive disadvantage to out-of-state egg producers.95 If
California could no longer use the small “battery” cages but was
required to use larger “colony” cages (or to go cage-free), the cost of
production would increase for California producers, and they would
have to raise the cost of eggs as sold to consumers, while out-of-state
egg producers could keep their prices lower. In his signing
statement, Governor Schwarzenegger stated, “By ensuring that all
eggs sold in California meet the requirements of Proposition 2, this
bill is good for both California egg producers and animal welfare.”96 Not
only do the two statutes have different rationales, but they may have
different applicable standards. 97 It is not clear whether AB 1437
incorporates the same colony cage standards of Proposition 2 or
requires out-of-state producers to go entirely cage-free.98 California
is using discriminatory means to protect in-state interests, and a
court evaluating the constitutionality of AB 1437 should apply strict
scrutiny.
In applying strict scrutiny review, the Supreme Court has stated
that “[t]he crucial inquiry here must be directed to determining
whether [the regulation] is basically an economic protectionist
measure, and thus virtually per se invalid, or a law directed at
legitimate local concerns that has only incidental effects on
interstate commerce.”99 AB 1437 was passed after Proposition 2. It
was passed in response to public concern that the massive California
egg industry might be wiped out by out-of-state competition after
Proposition 2 went into effect.100 It is evident that at least one

95. Wyatt Buchanan, Law Extends State’s Egg Mandates to Imports, SFGATE, July
7, 2010, http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Law-extends-state-s-egg-mandates
-to-imports-3182388.php.
96. Susan Ferriss, Schwarzenegger Signs Bill Requiring “Humane” Out-of-State Eggs,
THE SACRAMENTO BEE (July 7, 2010) (emphasis added), https://charleslincoln3.files
.wordpress.com/2014/02/missouri-v-harris-exhibit-n-22schwarzenegger-signs-bill
-requiring-22humane22-out-of-state-eggs22-2-14cv00341_docketentry_02-03-2014_2
-14.pdf.
97. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 49, at 14.
98. See id. at ER46–ER47.
99. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 617 (1978) (citing Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
100. Buchanan, supra note 95.
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motivation behind the enactment of AB 1437 is economic
protectionism.101 Thus, it should be invalid.102
While the Ninth Circuit dismissed the case on standing grounds,
if the case were brought by the proper plaintiffs, it should not be
dismissed. There is not a legitimate local purpose that outweighs the
burden on interstate commerce. The California cage-hen case is
distinguishable from Maine v. Taylor, in which the Court found that
Maine’s prohibition on the importation of live baitfish was valid,
because protecting its fish population from harmful non-native
species was a legitimate local concern.103 Here, protecting laying
hens from a marginally higher risk of salmonella is not a legitimate
local concern (or at least it is a concern that does not weigh heavily),
and there are other ways of reducing the risk of salmonella than
requiring out-of-state producers to house hens in larger cages.
2.

Even-Handed Regulation with Incidental Effects on State
Commerce

Even if considered even-handed regulations with incidental
effects on interstate commerce and therefore evaluated under the
lower standard of review, both the California regulations and the
Massachusetts regulation should be invalidated because they place
an undue burden on interstate commerce.104
a.

California’s AB 1437

No matter how AB 1437 is applied, it will place an undue burden
on egg producers by making production significantly more
expensive. Some estimates show that if applied coextensively with
Proposition 2, the cost of producing eggs could rise at least twelve
percent.105 If producers are required to implement cage-free
production, the production costs could increase by more than thirty-

101. See, e.g., Ferriss, supra note 96.
102. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (finding “conservation”
to be an illegitimate local state interest “when equally effective nondiscriminatory
conservation measures are available”).
103. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 131 (1986).
104. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (“Where the statute regulates even-handedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”).
105. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 49, at 14.
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four percent.106 When these serious burdens are weighed against the
marginal benefit of reducing the possibility of salmonella, this
regulation violates the dormant Commerce Clause.
In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., the Arizona state law requiring
Arizona cantaloupes to be processed in Arizona so that they could
be labeled as Arizona cantaloupes placed an undue burden on
interstate commerce because the company would have needed to
build a second packaging plant when there was already one built
across the border in a neighboring state.107 Similarly, here,
producers will need to build different, additional, or duplicative
cages in order to comply with the California regulations. This is
unduly burdensome.
b.

Massachusetts’ Prevention of Farm Animal Cruelty Act

The Massachusetts law violates the dormant Commerce Clause
for the same reasons. Moreover, the Massachusetts law demonstrates
the difficulty egg producers will face not only with attempting to
comply with one law but with a patchwork of burdensome laws. They
will have to build different cages to comply with different state and
local laws.108 They will also need to segregate which eggs go to which
states to comply with those laws. This represents an undue burden
on interstate commerce, and the laws should be struck down as
inconsistent with the dormant Commerce Clause.
B.

Congress Should Pass a Uniform Federal Law Nullifying State Laws

Congress should offer a solution that prohibits states from
enacting laws setting specific cage sizes for out-of-state producers.
This will create fairness among egg producers and avoid the expense
and burden of attempting to comply with a patchwork of state laws
with different requirements for cage sizes. The GMO labeling bill
compromise was reached because Congress determined that a
uniform federal law would avoid placing an undue burden on
industry in needing to comply with various labeling requirements,
including those of Vermont.109 The same is true in the context of the
106. Id.
107. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
108. See, e.g., 2016 Mass. Acts 333, §§ 5(E), 5(J) (West, Westlaw through Nov. 8,
2016) (requiring that a laying hen must have at least 1.5 square feet of usable floor
space to be considered able to fully extend its limbs).
109. See generally Charles, supra note 88.
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laying-hen cage-size controversy. The recent Ninth Circuit
affirmance demonstrates that industry will continue to bear the
burden of enforcing the dormant Commerce Clause if Congress
does not act.110
Iowa Representative Steve King previously attempted to prohibit
states from making such regulations by introducing the so-called
King Amendment in the Agricultural Act of 2014.111 The
amendment was not included in the final version of the bill.112 Critics
of the amendment were concerned that it would have the
unintended consequence of invalidating a number of constitutional
state health and safety laws.113 Proponents of the amendment were
concerned about the negating the effects of the California law on
egg producers in Iowa and other states.114
The proposed King Amendment stated, “[c]onsistent with
Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution of the United States,
the government of a State or locality therein shall not impose a
standard or condition on the production or manufacture of any
agricultural product sold or offered for sale in interstate commerce”
under certain circumstances.115 The circumstances included were:
(1) such production or manufacture occurs in another
State; and
(2) the standard or condition is in addition to the
standards and conditions applicable to such production or
manufacture pursuant to—
(A) Federal law; and
(B) the laws of the State and locality in which such
production or manufacture occurs.116
This proposed language is consistent with the dormant
Commerce Clause.117 It would reduce the burden placed on egg
producers, some of whom may otherwise be required to comply with
both the California and Massachusetts laws, and possibly others.118
110. See Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 847 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2017).
111. See H.R. 687, 113th Cong. (2013).
112. Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, 128 Stat. 649 (2014).
113. See Iowa Rep. Steve King Lays an Egg on the Farm Bill, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2014,
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-king-amendment-farm-bill
-20140123-story.html.
114. See id.
115. H.R. 687.
116. Id.
117. See generally supra Section II.A.
118. Compare 2016 Mass. Acts 333, § 5(E) (West, Westlaw through Nov. 8, 2016)
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The King Amendment is just one example of a national
legislative solution to the current problem. A revised version of the
King Amendment could be passed with a clarification to address
some of the concerns about unintended preemption of state health
and safety laws. Alternatively, as with the GMO labelling law,
Congress could pass a law setting a uniform cage size for laying hens.
In any case, a uniform federal standard would be the most efficient
solution to avoid unnecessary litigation and the burden of
compliance with multiple conflicting state standards.
IV. CONCLUSION
With an increasing interest in animal welfare and food
traceability from the American public, it is likely that dormant
Commerce Clause litigation in the agricultural production industry
will only intensify. While only two states currently have regulations
regarding cage sizes for laying hens that cross state lines, the industry
is already feeling the burden of increased and conflicting standards
for production. As additional states consider or pass legislation, it
will only make it more imperative that a national consensus is
reached on this issue. Because of the difficulty and expense of
litigating each instance individually, Congress should act. Congress
should either use the recent GMO labelling law as inspiration to
resolve these issues by setting a national standard or enact legislation
consistent with the dormant Commerce Clause prohibiting states
from regulating agricultural production in a way that puts an
excessive burden on interstate commerce.

(requiring that a laying hen must have at least 1.5 square feet, or 216 square inches,
of usable floor space to be considered able to fully extend its limbs), with CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 3, § 1350(d)(1) (West, Westlaw through Jan. 13, 2017) (requiring 116
inches of floor space per bird).
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